Abstract

Leading approaches in the literature on women's representation have studied the effects of gender quotas in their interaction with the national electoral system. Two aspects of Mexican law have been understudied thus far, but provide important insights for understanding the degree to which quotas empower women in politics. First, quota enforcement at the subnational level depends on state-level laws, which in some cases dictate partial or no enforcement at all. Second, the joint ticket system has created a two-nominee system in which two elected figures run; the first occupies the seat (propietario) while the second is elected as a substitute (suplente). Quotas in some states may apply only to suplentes, resulting in women's entrapment in substitute and powerless positions. The analysis is based on new aggregated dataset on the nomination and election of women in a sample of 12 states' elections covering the period of 1998 to 2010.

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