Federal reform and the quality of representation in Belgium

Abstract

One of the ways in which ‘good’ representation can be measured and assessed is by the degree of congruence between the preferences of the population and the preferences and policies of the political elite. One of the arguments for defending decentralisation is that governmental institutions on a smaller territorial scale can be closer to the population, and that they can provide policies that are more responsive to the population of the sub-states. This argument is often made in Belgium, where voters in Flanders traditionally vote centre-right, while the voters of Wallonia vote centre-left, and where federal coalitions need to reflect the preferences of both regions whereas regional governments can be responsive to their voters only. Using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, this paper tests this assumption and compares the left–right orientation of the population and of governments at the different institutional levels and regions. The findings suggest that sub-state governments are partially more congruent to their sub-state voters than federal governments. However, congruence gaps are less related to constraints in government formation than to changes in behaviour of key political actors.