Abstract
This research demonstrates the importance of the mediating role of agency preference distributions that differentiate the influence of political institutions on bureaucratic agencies. A spatial model is developed in the context of U.S. regulatory federalism to posit that the responsiveness of state agencies to federal institutions will be greater as state agencies exhibit a stronger policy bias by enforcing regulatory rules at an either extremely low or high level. The results of Quantile Regression analysis of state enforcement of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act show that bureaucratic responsiveness to the preferences of the federal institutions is unequal across different state agencies.
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