FED ve TCMB Politika Kararları Arasındaki Stratejik Etkileşimin Testi: Toda-Yamamoto Yaklaşımı

Abstract

This study is based on analyzing a strategic interaction situation between Federal Reserve Bank(FED) and Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey(CBRT) policy decisions. In this context, our study analyzes whether the policies implemented by the CBRT are affected by the policy decisions of the FED through a theoretical leader-follower relationship. For this, the interaction game between FED and CBRT is theoretically modeled. The hypotheses proposed in the model were tested using the Toda-Yamamoto approach for the 2006M01-2020M12 periods. Findings show that the game is theoretically the leader of the FED and a leader-follower situation arises between the FED and the CBRT.