FEASIBILITY IN OPTIMIZING ETHICS

Abstract

AbstractDoing the best we can in the world as it is requires that appropriate account be taken of “feasibility considerations.” The object of this essay is to examine what “appropriate account” amounts to — and specifically how “feasibility” should be conceptualized so as to operate most congenially with “desirability considerations.” One element in this exercise is to recognize “feasibility” not so much as a category as “coming in degrees” (just as desirability must be recognized). A second element is to specify evaluands as actions — objects that the advisee controls — rather than as objects that lie somewhere intermediate along the path from actions to final desirability principles. This move serves to collapse all feasibility issues to ones relating to the consequences of genuine actions rather than “feasibility of” other kinds of objects of evaluation. A particular problem in the proper treatment of feasibility considerations is the tendency to begin from the “ought-implies-can” principle, a point of departure that frames feasibility considerations in a dismissive or otherwise inadequate way.