Abstract
In this paper, a false data injection prevention protocol (FDIPP) for smart grid distribution systems is proposed. The protocol is designed to work over a novel hierarchical communication network architecture that matches the distribution system hierarchy and its vast number of entities. The proposed protocol guarantees both system and data integrity via preventing packet injection, duplication, alteration, and rogue node access. Therefore, it prevents service disruption or damaging power network assets due to drawing the wrong conclusions about the current operating status of the power grid. Moreover, the impact of the FDIPP protocol on communication network performance is studied using intensive computer simulations. The simulation study shows that the proposed communication architecture is scalable and meets the packet delay requirements of inter-substation communication as mandated by IEC 61850-90-1 with a minimal packet loss while the security overhead of FDIPP is taken into account.
Highlights
Smart grids represent the generation of power systems
Remote session termination can be met in a distributed fashion in the proposed architecture by defining an inactivity timer that leads to terminating inactive sessions that are initiated from secondary substations and primary substations
We investigate the impact of using more than one gateway, where each gateway forwards the traffic of an substation clusters or clouds (SSCs) that has a smaller number of nodes than the first scenario
Summary
Smart grids represent the generation of power systems. They aim at turning the conventional power grid into a smart one using advanced information and communication technologies. Realizing the technical goals of smart grids requires efficient machine-to-machine (M2M) communication between intelligent devices, which implies an increased risk of communication and information security vulnerabilities Exploiting such information system vulnerabilities is much more critical than exploiting vulnerabilities in conventional power networks. These substations are anticipated to use different kinds of sensing equipment in future distribution systems such as phasor measurement units and intelligent electronic devices They are anticipated to generate large M2M data volume, which poses a significant challenge to securing the underlying communication network architecture. The document shows a remarkable effort that can significantly reduce vulnerabilities It has defined cyber-security requirement development guidelines for communication interfaces between different smart grid domains. This work focuses on two main security aspects of smart grid distribution systems, namely, data confidentiality and integrity.
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