Fast and slow thinking as secret agents behind speakers’ (un)conscious pragmatic decisions and judgements

Abstract

In this article I discuss and explore how two cognitive systems –fast and slow thinking– may affect our pragmatic decisions and judgements. I draw on Kahneman's (2011) description of mental life by the metaphor of two agents, System 1 and System 2, which respectively produce fast and slow thinking. The capabilities of System 1 include –among other things– mental, linguistic and sociopragmatic activities, all of which have an effect on people's relational work (Locher and Watts 2005). Research in psychology (cf. McGuire and Botvinick 2010; Simon 1992; Klein 1999) suggests that the ‘intuitive’ System 1 is frequently more influential than the ‘rational’ System 2, the former thus being the secret author of many of human beings' choices and judgments, including those speakers make in discourse.My approach in this study is therefore multidisciplinary. Drawing from Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Pragmatics, Functional Linguistics, (Socio)pragmatics and Discourse Analysis, I theoretically explore how the systems of fast and slow thinking participate in our discourse-pragmatic decisions and activities. I also analyze different examples of statements and short narratives where the (un)conscious exploitation of the interplay between these two systems (for the negotiation of pragmatic meanings) can be appreciated.