Farsightedness, Changing Stock Location and the Stability of International Fisheries Agreements

Abstract

Changes in stock location may affect the stability of international fisheries agreements. This paper offers a theoretical analysis of the stability of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) in a non-cooperative, coalition formation game based on the classic Gordon–Schaefer model. We employ a new stability concept which modifies Farsighted Stability (Chwe, J Econ Theory 63:299–325, 1994). We call this concept farsighted downwards stability (FDS). We also employ the internal stability (IS) concept for comparison. Analytical results regarding FDS for symmetric players without changing stock location show stable Grand Coalitions for $$n\le 4$$ player games and the possibility for partial cooperation. Sensitivity analysis deals with changing stock location and cost asymmetry. Stability decreases in $$n$$ , increases when costs are asymmetric and increases when FDS is employed. Farsighted conjectures on behalf of RFMO members can thus help to maintain cooperation as stock location changes. However, FDS is more sensitive to changes in stock location than IS.