Family Relation and the Philosophy of Emotion

Abstract

The paper aims to establish an alternative concept of family in terms of intimate feelings and affective narrative. Family relation cannot be defined in the way that traditional philosophy posits, for the set of essential properties common to all types of family cannot be found. Family can be formed in diverse manners and for various reasons. In this paper, I offer an alternative way to form family relation by making the claim to family relation by virtue of family language and intentional attitudes. Family language has the self-referring structure in which the speaker identifies himself to be a family member by virtue of making the claim. The ground for such a claim is not necessarily related to hereditary relation or judicial arrangement. Love or affection can function as the ground for the claim to family relation, supported by commitment and relevant behavioral patterns. I classify family language as a type of speech act, specifically, belonging to the class of behabitives. Behabitives are speech acts which require the speaker to meet the sincerity condition and to perform in accord with a codified pattern of relevant actions. Thus, love or compassion or intimate feelings should be vented in order to make family relation possible and thereby the speaker makes himself a moral agent taking duty and responsibility.