Abstract

PurposeThis paper investigates whether board composition, a family chief executive officer (CEO) and the firm's managerial capabilities affect proactive tax management in family small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The main statement is that the professionalisation of corporate government and management practices explains the difference in tax avoidance behaviour in closely held family SMEs.Design/methodology/approachUsing the 2012 Spanish thin-capitalisation rule as a quasi-experiment, the authors estimate panel regressions with firm fixed effects and robust standard errors. This model represents a triple difference-in-differences combined with propensity score matching (PSM-DID).FindingsAnalysis shows that having a high proportion of non-family board members and a high endowment of managerial capabilities lead to tax liability optimisation in family SMEs. Conversely, familial boards and family SMEs with low managerial capabilities lack enough expertise to weigh the costs of tax avoidance over the benefits, resulting in a reluctance to engage in tax optimisation behaviours. Alike, results show no significant relation between CEO's family affiliation and tax management behaviour.Practical implicationsWhen implementing fiscal policies, the specific needs of family SMEs should be considered, and how these needs interact with corporate governance and managerial mechanisms. Moreover, policymakers need a deeper understanding of family SMEs in order to develop policies appropriate to their characteristics. A more comprehensive knowledge of how family firm heterogeneity affects corporate decisions, such as indebtedness and fiscal decisions, may improve public policies.Originality/valueThis study addresses the issue of tax behaviour in family SMEs in a particular event that implies a specific logic to weigh the pros and cons of each alternative: reducing debt or paying more taxes. This study’s conclusions are based on a model that deals with potential endogeneity problems, which avoids bias in the findings.

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