Abstract
In the paper, we examine the relationships between corporate governance mechanism and cash holdings to determine whether family firms with lower agency costs have smaller cash holdings, compared with non-family firms. We find that family firms are more inclined to haver smaller cash holdings, whereas non-family firms lead to entrenched managers having more cash holdings. Foreign investors are found to have no impact on the firm's cash holdings.
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