Abstract
This paper examines the ways in which three external governance mechanisms, namely market preferences, institutional investors, and debtholder monitoring, influence dividend payout decisions under a family-governance system. We find that family firms issue lower dividends when the dividend premium is high in the market. Institutional investors and family-controlled governance mechanisms interact to increase dividend payouts. Family firms under greater debtholder monitoring pay out more cash to shareholders. Our findings generate important policy implications.
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