FAMILIARITY TRANSFER AS AN EXPLANATION OF THE DÉJÀ VU EFFECT.

Abstract

Déjà vu is often explained in terms of an unconscious transfer of familiarity between a familiar object or objects and accompanying new objects. However, empirical research tests more the priming effectiveness than such a transfer. This paper reviews the main explanations of déjà vu, proposes a cognitive model of the phenomenon, and tests its six major assumptions. The model states that a sense of familiarity can be felt toward an objectively new stimulus (point 1) and that it can be transferred from a known stimulus to a novel one (point 2) in a situation where the person is unaware of such a transfer (point 3). The criteria for déjà vu are that the known and the novel stimuli may have graphical or semantic similarity, but differences exclude priming explanations (point 4); the familiarity measure should be of an non-rational nature (sense of familiarity rather than recognition; point 5); and that the feeling of familiarity toward a novel stimuli produces a conflict, which could be measured by means of increased reaction (point 6). 119 participants were tested in three experiments. The participants were to assess the novel stimuli in terms of their sense of familiarity. The novel stimuli were primed or were not primed by the known stimulus (Exp. 1) or primed by the known vs a novel stimulus (Exp. 2 and 3). The priming was subliminal in all the experiments. Reaction times were measured in Exps. 2 and 3. The participants assessed the novel stimuli as more familiar when they were preceded by a known stimulus than when they were not (Exp. 1) or when they were preceded by a novel stimulus (Exps. 2 and 3). Reaction times were longer for assessments preceded by known stimulus than for assessments preceded by a novel stimulus, which contradicts the priming explanations. The results seem to support all six points of the proposed model of the mechanisms underlying the déjà vu experience.