Abstract
ABSTRACT Studies of the relationship between ministers and UK intelligence agencies have tended to focus on the government’s use of intelligence, while studies of intelligence oversight have focused almost exclusively on the work of parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee. This article examines the role of the executive in the oversight of the UK intelligence and security agencies. It traces the evolution of ministerial accountability for the UK intelligence and security agencies and raises questions about the capacity of ministers to provide effective scrutiny in this area, focusing on ministers’ knowledge and understanding of intelligence, ministerial workload and potential conflicts of interest.
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