Abstract
This article analyses Britain’s struggle to conduct warfare as a member of a coalition during the first war against Revolutionary France. It focuses on Anglo-Austrian planning in the winter of 1793–4 and the effort to implement these plans in the spring of 1794. Scholars have attributed the coalition’s defeat in Flanders to Austro-Prussian distractions in Poland and the botched British attempt to supersede this through subsidies. In contrast, this article illustrates that delays in planning, preparations, and operations hamstrung the coalition’s 1794 campaign in Flanders in the spring, before the diplomatic and military reversals of the summer.
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