False Pleasures and Plato's Philebus

Abstract

In the Republic and the Philebus, Plato allows that some pleasures have a place in a good life, at least for people, if not for gods. He maintains, however, that some pleasures have no place in a good human life. They have neither intrinsic nor instrumental value. This means that the value or goodness of the pleasures which do have a place in a good life must consist of something more, or other than, their pleasantness, for the pleasures which have no place in a good human life share the property of pleasantness. In Book IX of the Republic, Plato attempts to distinguish good pleasures from bad. Apparently dissatisfied with this effort, Plato undertakes in the Philebus to restate his overall moral theory and its distinction between good and bad pleasures. In the Philebus, Plato argues that some pleasures are false, and that false pleasures have no place in a good life. Notwithstanding significant scholarly attention, Plato’s Philebus continues to generate significant interpretive and analytic dissensus at three levels. The first concerns the extent to which it provides a coherent and unified general account of pleasure. 1 The second concerns the extent to which it provides a coherent, unified, and normatively significant account of false pleasures. 2 The third concerns the extent to which its account of false pleasures coheres with its general account of pleasure, and with the account of true pleasures given in Book IX of the Republic. I will make an initial case for the coherence, unity, and normative significance of the account of false pleasures given in the Philebus. I will also suggest a reading of the Philebus which minimizes conflict between its general account of pleasure and its more specific account of false pleasures, while preserving a high degree of continuity between the Philebus and the Republic, especially Book IX.