False Optimism? Leibniz, Evil, and the Best of all Possible Worlds

Lloyd Strickland

doi:10.35765/forphil.2010.1501.02

Abstract

Leibniz’s claim that this is the best of all possible worlds has been subject to numerous criticisms, both from his contemporaries and ours. In this paper I investigate a cluster of such criticisms based on the existence, abundance or character of worldly evil. As several Leibniz-inspired versions of optimism have been advanced in recent years, the aim of my investigation is to assess not just how Leibniz’s brand of optimism fares against these criticisms, but also whether optimism as a philosophy has the resources to meet these challenges. I show that none of the criticisms considered has sufficient force to pose a threat to Leibniz’s version of optimism or to one modelled on it.

Highlights

Leibniz’s doctrine of optimism, which holds that our world is the best of all those possible, has undoubtedly been one of the most vilified in the history of western philosophy
The aim is to determine if Leibnizian optimism is defensible in light of certain oft-made objections to it. Such an investigation might initially seem to be of historical interest only, but this is not the case; several versions of optimism, some very similar to Leibniz’s own, have been advanced in recent years (e.g. Strickland 2005, Little 2005), so assessing how Leibniz’s brand of optimism fares against various objections from worldly evil – objections still made by contemporary philosophers – will throw light on whether optimism as a philosophy has the resources to meet these challenges
I shall argue that, despite boasting support from a number of philosophical heavyweights past and present, the objections and complaints based on evil do not have sufficient force to pose a threat either to Leibniz’s version of optimism or to one modelled on it

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Leibniz’s doctrine of optimism, which holds that our world is the best of all those possible, has undoubtedly been one of the most vilified in the history of western philosophy. The aim is to determine if Leibnizian optimism is defensible in light of certain oft-made objections to it. Such an investigation might initially seem to be of historical interest only, but this is not the case; several versions of optimism, some very similar to Leibniz’s own, have been advanced in recent years Strickland 2005, Little 2005), so assessing how Leibniz’s brand of optimism fares against various objections from worldly evil – objections still made by contemporary philosophers – will throw light on whether optimism as a philosophy has the resources to meet these challenges. I shall argue that, despite boasting support from a number of philosophical heavyweights past and present, the objections and complaints based on evil do not have sufficient force to pose a threat either to Leibniz’s version of optimism or to one modelled on it

THE ‘TOO MUCH EVIL’ OBJECTION

A NECESSARY EVIL

THE ‘USELESS PASSIVITY’ AND ‘NO HOPE’ COMPLAINTS

Conclusion