False Metaphors and Nonsense: Retort to Nelson Goodman

Abstract

In my criticism of Professor Goodman's theory of metaphor (see How Metaphor Makes Its Wonders [this volume]), I have tried to show it doesn't give an account of metaphorical falsity (i.e., conditions under which a sentence, taken metaphorically, is false) and it also doesn't leave room for metaphorical falsehood. I don't think, as Professor Goodman's reply (see Contraverting a Contradiction [this volume]) seems to suggest, there is a conflict in fact such similes as A: that lake is like a sapphire are (literally) true, while parallel metaphor B: that lake is a sapphire comes out false when taken literally. Indeed, why should there be any conflict? The fact literal reading of a metaphor doesn't make sense (i.e., comes out false) is very reason for seeking a paraphrase which does (e.g., B), or a nonstandard interpretation of its focal term (sapphire, in our case). What I was trying to point out was when Goodman (1976 [1968]: 77-78) says the difference between simile and metaphor is negligible, he should also accept consequence all metaphors are true, since all similes (taken literally) are true. In his reply, Goodman tries to forestall this conclusion by asserting claim quoted above does not pertain to sentences like A, taken literally (as I thought it did), but only to such sentences when takenfiguratively. I shall leave it to reader to decide whether relevant passages (Goodman