False Dichotomy in Epistemic Decolonisation of Philosophy

Abstract

In this theoretical chapter, the author argues that universities in Africa tend to sideline African epistemological voices in favour of Western epistemology on the basis of a flawed reasoning procedure. The task in this chapter is to examine the disjunctive argument that is often used in demarcating Western and African epistemologies and evaluate the false dichotomy fallacy involved. Critics and defenders of the epistemic decolonisation of philosophy tend to rely on an implicit disjunctive argument, though in different directions, as a basis for accepting one epistemological paradigm and rejecting another. The epistemological paradigms that stand as radically opposed are the African epistemological paradigm and the Western epistemological paradigm. The argumentative strategy by either the defender or critic of decolonisation of philosophy is to present the two systems of philosophy as alternatives in the first premise. The second premise negates one disjunct and the other disjunct is dropped as the conclusion. While in theory the disjunctive arguments promise to yield logically valid conclusions, an analysis of the arguments shows that they rely on a false dichotomy. The false dichotomy is evident in the premises provided, thereby making the argument unsound. To escape the problem of false dichotomy, the author propose a strategy that involves a third possibility of pluriversal thinking that sees knowledge production as partial and context-specific. To enrich epistemology in African universities, it is important to draw epistemological issues from multiple sources without suppressing any voice.