False data injection attacks on sensors against state estimation in cyber-physical systems

Abstract

In this paper, the problem about the false data injection attacks on sensors to degrade the state estimation performance in cyber-physical systems(CPSs) is investigated. The attack strategies for unstable systems and stable ones are both designed. For unstable systems, based on the idea of zero dynamics, an unbounded attack strategy is proposed which can drive the state estimation error variations to infinity. The proposed method is more general than existing unbounded attack strategies since it relaxes the requirement for the initial value of the estimation error. For stable systems, it is difficult to bring unbounded impacts on the estimation error variations. Therefore, in this case, an attack strategy with adjustable attack performance which makes the estimation error variations track predesigned target values is proposed. Furthermore, a uniform attack strategy which aims to deteriorate state estimation for both stable systems and unstable ones is derived. Finally, simulations are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack strategies.