Falling through the social safety net? Analysing non‐take‐up of minimum income benefit and monetary social assistance in Austria

Michael Fuchs,Katrin Gasior,Anette Scoppetta,Katarina Hollan,Tamara Premrov

doi:10.1111/spol.12581

Abstract

AbstractNon‐take‐up of means tested benefits is a widespread phenomenon in European welfare states. The paper assesses whether the reform that replaced the monetary social assistance benefit by the minimum income benefit in Austria in 2010/11 has succeeded in increasing take up rates. We use EU‐SILC register data together with the tax‐benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD/SORESI. The results show that the reform led to a significant decrease of non‐take‐up from 53 to 30% in terms of the number of households and from 51 to 30% in terms of expenditure. Following the three‐t's (threshold, trigger, and trade‐off) introduced by Van Oorschot, estimates of a two‐stage Heckman selection model as well as expert interviews indicate that the taken measures include both threshold and trade‐off characteristics. Elements such as the higher degree of anonymity within the claiming process, the provision of health insurance, binding minimum standards, the limitation of the maintenance obligations, new regulations related to the liquidation of wealth, as well as the general coverage of the benefit reform in the media and in public discussions led to an improved access to the benefit.

Highlights

The degree to which benefits reach the desired target groups has become a key performance indicator of social protection programs
International organizations like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Commission call for “well-targeted income-support policies” (OECD 2011, p.40) that reach those in need at times when they need support (European Commission, 2013)
The paper studies the effects of the 2010/11 social assistance benefit reform in Austria on non-take-up

Summary

| INTRODUCTION

The degree to which benefits reach the desired target groups has become a key performance indicator of social protection programs. A basic hypothesis is that households apply for a certain social transfer if the anticipated benefit exceeds the anticipated costs, similar to a cost–benefit equation This consideration relates to direct as well as indirect costs of applying, including both objective components like the level of benefit, the expected duration of receipt, information costs (about benefit and eligibility regulations as well as application procedures), administrative costs (e.g., queuing, filling forms, need to report detailed information to the welfare agency, and checks on the willingness to accept suitable job offers), and the uncertainty of success (Bruckmeier, Pauser, Walwei, & Wiemers, 2013; Eurofound, 2015; Hümbelin, 2016) as well as subjective motives such as stigmatization, self-esteem, or personal moral beliefs (Frick & Groh-Samberg, 2007; Warin, 2014).

| RESULTS

Findings

| CONCLUSION