Abstract
ABSTRACT Quasi-realists face the challenge of providing a plausible analysis of acknowledgments of moral fallibility (for example, ‘I believe that lying is wrong, but I might be mistaken’). This paper develops a new analysis of these acknowledgements, according to which they express moral uncertainty. After advertising the advantages of this analysis, I take up the question of how to understand moral uncertainty in expressivist terms.
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