Abstract
Behavioral findings in several strategic games indicate that people punish others if they think they are being treated unequally, even at the cost of minimizing their own material payoff. We investigated the primary driving force behind such non-self-regarding behavior, so-called, altruistic cooperation. In all of our studies, a mini ultimatum game was played either one-shot (in Experiment 1a and 1b) or repeatedly (Experiment 2), and rejections of inequitable distribution were taken as a measure of altruistic cooperation. In Experiment 1a, we replicated previous findings indicating that the key mechanism contributing to the emergence of altruistic cooperation is fairness considerations. In Experiment 1b, we delved into the relative importance of two aspects of fairness considerations (i.e., outcome fairness and intentions) and showed that both aspects were effective in determining the level of altruistic cooperation, with the contribution of intentions being more important. In Experiment 2, we investigated the effect of the opportunity for reputation building and future interaction on altruistic cooperation. We found that these factors became influential only when fairness considerations were weakened, particularly, as a result of the removal of the possible intentions behind an offer.
Highlights
Human altruistic cooperation presents a puzzle from the perspectives of both the standard economic models of the “self-interested actor” and the evolutionary models of the “self-regarding individual” because it involves some characteristics that are difficult to reconcile with the predictions of standard game theoretical and evolutionary analyses
The rejection rates were still not identical across the four games. This is an indication that these rejections were shaped by how unfair the outcome was perceived in comparison to the outcomes yielded by the alternative distributions. These results support the idea that two aspects of fairness considerations are involved in the emergence of costly punishment, but the contribution of the intention aspect of fairness considerations seems greater, especially when the alternative distribution yields a more equitable outcome [i.e., the (5/5) game]
GENERAL DISCUSSION In Experiment 1a, we confirmed that people respond to intentional unfairness in a Mini Ultimatum Game (UG) at a cost to their own material payoff
Summary
Human altruistic cooperation presents a puzzle from the perspectives of both the standard economic models of the “self-interested actor” and the evolutionary models of the “self-regarding individual” because it involves some characteristics that are difficult to reconcile with the predictions of standard game theoretical and evolutionary analyses. One of the best-known economic games used to demonstrate altruistic cooperation, costly punishment, is the Ultimatum Game (UG) (Güth et al, 1982). In this game two players are presented with a sum of money; one of them is assigned to the role of Proposer while the other one to the role of Responder. The Proposer is asked to offer any portion of the money to the Responder. If the Responder accepts the amount offered, the money is distributed in accordance with the proposal.
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