Abstract
The sensitivity to fairness undergoes relevant changes across development. Whether such changes depend on primary inequity aversion or on sensitivity to a social norm of fairness is still debated. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game that creates informational asymmetries between Proposer and Responder, a previous study showed that both perceptions of fairness and fair behavior depend upon normative expectations, i.e., beliefs about what others expect one should do in a specific situation. Individuals tend to comply with the norm when risking sanctions, but disregard the norm when violations are undetectable. Using the same methodology with children aged 8–10 years, the present study shows that children's beliefs and behaviors differ from what is observed in adults. Playing as Proposers, children show a self-serving bias only when there is a clear informational asymmetry. Playing as Responders, they show a remarkable discrepancy between their normative judgment about fair procedures (a coin toss to determine the offer) and their behavior (rejection of an unfair offer derived from the coin toss), supporting the existence of an outcome bias effect. Finally, our results reveal no influence of theory of mind on children's decision-making behavior.
Highlights
Recent research on decision-making in children has shown strong inequity aversion in Ultimatum games [1]
Children consistently reject unfair offers [2]. This might be due to primary inequity aversion or to sensitivity to social norms of fairness
Individuals will have a conditional preference to follow a fairness norm depending upon the existence of the relevant empirical and normative expectations [4]
Summary
Recent research on decision-making in children has shown strong inequity aversion in Ultimatum games [1] In such games, children consistently reject unfair offers [2]. Children consistently reject unfair offers [2] This might be due to primary inequity aversion or to sensitivity to social norms of fairness. According to the view of social norms we adopt here [4], the decision to accept or reject an offer depends upon the empirical and normative expectations entertained by the individual. Individuals will have a conditional preference to follow a fairness norm depending upon the existence of the relevant empirical and normative expectations [4]. Whenever there is a general agreement that most members of the relevant group consider certain behaviors to be fair, we can be reasonably sure that a shared norm of fairness exists
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