Abstract
In this paper we present a two-period model in which we examine how concerns about fairness might affect voter behavior. We show that politicians choose the median voter's position in the first period even if this does not correspond to their bliss points and neither they nor voters can commit to a particular action. Moreover, inequity aversion creates substantial incumbency advantages. Our results hold even if voters care very little about fairness.
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