Abstract
A holdout problem arises in a land assembly environment in which one buyer is interested in a large landmass characterized by fragmented ownership among many landowners. A simple holdout-resolving mechanism is obtained that asymptotically (as the number of landowners increase) solves a mechanism design problem with two novel criteria. One, a partial coercion constraint that respects property rights only in an ‘aggregate’ sense; and two, a fairness constraint that requires the terms of trade (per unit area) to be the same for every landowner. The mechanism is budget-balanced, semi-anonymous, weakly strategy-proof and non-coercive for the buyer while also being strategy-proof in the large for landowners.
Published Version
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