Abstract
The aim of this paper is to incorporate fair play norms into the analysis of contests where players have the ability to cheat in order to improve their chances of winning. We propose a utility function integrating fair play norms and apply it to a stylized model of rank-order tournament with cheating. We study how the set of equilibria is affected by the presence of fair play values. These values are shown to have an ambiguous impact on the incentives to cheat so that it may happen that there is more cheating with fair play values than without. We also study the impact of the number of contestants, with results suggesting that fair play norms may be effective in closed tournaments with few competitors (such as, for example, promotions in firms), but not in large-scale tournaments such as worldwide athletic or academic contests.
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