Fair Market Constitutionalism: From Neo-liberal to Democratic Liberal Economic Governance

Abstract

Abstract Neo-liberalism was in crisis well before COVID-19; and COVID-19 has only further highlighted the gaps and fault lines in existing liberal democratic models. But this does not mean that we should walk away from liberal ideals, or the general idea of globalisation or market-based forms of ordering. Instead, we should seek a new, more ‘democratic’ or pro-social understanding of the liberal ideal, which emphasises the idea of fair rather over free markets. This idea of fair markets can be understood in numerous ways, but I suggest that it is best understood as entailing a commitment by the state to: (i) guaranteeing access to a public baseline of core goods, or access to a generous social minimum to all citizens, regardless of market outcomes; (ii) ensuring equality of access to certain ‘relative goods’; (iii) regulating market power or sources of monopoly power; and (iv) responding to or ‘internalising’ negative externalities or social costs associated with private market behaviour. The article explores what this entails for the design of constitutions, and especially constitutional property and social rights, and the scope and strength of judicial review. Ultimately, the article suggests, fair market constitutionalism points to the desirability of a combination of weak property and social rights—ie property rights that offer some but not complete protection for existing economic entitlements, coupled with legislative duties to implement fair market norms or limited weak social rights guarantees. But this does not mean that such guarantees can only be weakly enforced by courts: blockages in the democratic process may mean that courts can and should adopt a weak–strong—or responsive—approach to enforcing these fundamentally weak rights guarantees.