Abstract
We study divisions of a set of indivisible items among three or more people who have the same strict preferences on items but can have different preferences on subsets of items. Preferences on subsets are assumed representable by additive utilities. Each item is received by exactly one person and no payments are involved. The paper focuses on envy-freeness within a division and Pareto optimality among divisions. We characterize envy-free divisions through a notion of convex dominance and observe that a situation can have envy-free divisions none of which is Pareto-optimal.
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