Failed Statecraft: The United States in Afghanistan

Abstract

Prior to the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, a decades-long civil war had already riven the country. This had principally been the result of massive interventions from both competing sides in the Cold War, first the Soviet Union invading to prop up a government with no popular basis, then the West flooding the country with money and third-country militants in order to bleed the Soviet intervention forces. The civil strife that followed the Soviet withdrawal constituted a crucible from which the Taliban (“students” in Pashto) suddenly appeared and took de facto control of the country within two years. The Taliban’s origins are shadowy, clearly emerging from Islamic madrassas (hence their name) but also under the tutelage of the Pakistani intelligence services, yet they are also in their lineage direct descendants of the national resistance to Soviet occupation, just like most of the myriad forces they overcame to conquer Afghanistan.