Faculties, Knowledge, and Reasons for Doubt in the Cartesian Circle

Abstract

AbstractThis paper argues for a novel solution to the Cartesian Circle by emphasising the important epistemic role of the Second Meditation and Descartes’ faculty epistemology. I argue that, for Descartes: doubt requires a ‘good reason’ to doubt (§2.1); whether a reason qualifies as a ‘good reason’ depends on which faculty produces that reason (§2.2); and for distinct metaphysical perceptions from the faculty of the intellect, no other faculty can provide ‘good reasons’ to doubt (§2.3). The upshot of §2 is that the doubts raised up to the Third Meditation do not apply to the distinct metaphysical perceptions of the intellect, and in particular do not apply to the premises of the proof of the existence of God. I present the role of God as primarily to secure clear and distinct perceptions beyond the intellect, and knowledge of conclusions when those conclusions are no longer being clearly and distinctly perceived (§3.1). Finally, I give an account of Descartes’ use of ‘cognoscere’, ‘scire’, and ‘scientia’ as three distinct epistemic levels, providing a valuable structure within which one can see the meditator progress (§3.2).