Fact/Value Conflation and the Danger of the Traditional Models

Abstract

The decisionist and technocratic models of scientific expertise in policy are critically evaluated in this chapter regarding their potential to address the major pitfalls of scientific expertise in policy. The mistaken philosophical assumption of a fact/value dichotomy, which is underlying these two traditional science-policy models, is identified as the main weakness of these models. The assumption that factual statements and (ethical) value judgements can be neatly separated in policy-relevant research is crucial for these models and a necessary precondition for their understanding of scientific objectivity. However, there is an inevitable fact/value entanglement in scientific statements; values, including ethical ones, permeate all experience and scientific knowledge. Hence, the decisionist and technocratic models cannot ensure that expertise in policy-making processes is reliable for everyone. Instead, due to their mistaken assumption of fact/value separability, they often lead to a misguided use or even misuse of expertise in policy in terms of the legitimisation model. Consequently, the decisionist and technocratic models are unable to realise the general norms developed in Sect. 2.1.