Facts, values, and the naturalistic fallacy in psychology

Abstract

David Hume famously argued that we cannot logically move from sentences about how the world is, to sentences about how it ought to be. Doing so has been called the naturalistic fallacy since G.E. Moore. In this paper, I provide four different arguments against the thesis of the naturalistic fallacy in psychology: (1) the phenomenological argument, which goes back at least to the Gestalt psychologists, arguing for a place for values in a world of facts. (2) The constitutive rule argument, according to which social and mental life is dependent on normative rule-following. (3) The function argument, according to which value judgments about human functioning can be factual. (4) The thick description argument, according to which “thick ethical concepts” – expressing a union of fact and value – are indispensable in understanding human action. Together, they invite us to rethink facts, values, and the relationship between them in psychology.