Factors affecting the magnitude of subjective utility parameters in a tacit bargaining game

Abstract

Eighty male and female high school students played a modified version of the Siegel and Fouraker (1960) bilateral monopoly game, designed to assess the effects of two variables upon the development of aspiration level (AL), comparison level (CL), and comparison level for alternatives (CL nlt), and the interrelationships among these three subjective-utility parameters. Magnitude of: (a) the offers made by a programmed bargaining opponent (high vs low), and (b) the alternative to the bargaining relationship (high vs low) was varied in a 2 × 2 design. Subjects receiving high offers bargained tougher, rated themselves as more satisfied with their outcomes and, in support of the hypothesis, set their AL, CL, and CL alt estimates higher than those receiving low offers. Contrary to expectation, however, AL, CL, and CL alt were set highest by subjects in the “high offer-low alternative” condition. When subjects' three subjective-utility estimates were considered in relation to one another, all condition differences disappeared. These latter findings were interpreted using notions drawn from Upshaw's (1969) variable perspective theory of judgment.