Factions, Models and Resource Regulation: Prospects for Lowering the Maine Lobster Trap Limit

Abstract

One of the most important questions facing resource management is how to regulate industries exploiting natural resources. Currently there is an effort in the Maine lobster industry to get lower trap limits, which provides an opportunity to get detailed information on the political factors influencing legislation in an important and highly successful industry. In many industries, including the Maine lobster industry, many laws come in the aftermath of conflict between industry factions seeking laws to get distributional benefits. In the Maine lobster industry, the politics of getting lower trap limits are byzantine. Two factions have different models of the fishery, leading them to advocate different policies. The positions of people in each faction are very complicated. Those favoring a lower trap limit assume the industry is highly inefficient and that a lower trap limit would result in better catches per trap haul, lower costs of operations and higher profits. Some of those opposing a trap limit assume fishing more traps will lower profits; others assume it will raise profits. Those opposing lower trap limits offer five different sets of reasons for their viewpoint. To date, efforts to impose a lower trap limit have been blocked, but a number of factors could change the strength of the factions and tip the balance. In this industry, resource management policy is being made in an atmosphere in which different industry groups are pulling in different directions for complex sets of reasons.