Abstract
A theory of consciousness, whatever else it may do, must address the structure of experience. Our perceptual experiences are richly structured. Simply seeing a red apple, swaying between green leaves on a stout tree, involves symmetries, geometries, orders, topologies, and algebras of events. Are these structures also present in the world, fully independent of their observation? Perceptual theorists of many persuasions—from computational to radical embodied—say yes: perception veridically presents to observers structures that exist in an observer-independent world; and it does so because natural selection shapes perceptual systems to be increasingly veridical. Here we study four structures: total orders, permutation groups, cyclic groups, and measurable spaces. We ask whether the payoff functions that drive evolution by natural selection are homomorphisms of these structures. We prove, in each case, that generically the answer is no: as the number of world states and payoff values go to infinity, the probability that a payoff function is a homomorphism goes to zero. We conclude that natural selection almost surely shapes perceptions of these structures to be non-veridical. This is consistent with the interface theory of perception, which claims that natural selection shapes perceptual systems not to provide veridical perceptions, but to serve as species-specific interfaces that guide adaptive behavior. Our results present a constraint for any theory of consciousness which assumes that structure in perceptual experience is shaped by natural selection.
Highlights
If the experienced world of a neonate is unstructured, a “great blooming, buzzing confusion”, that of the adult is assuredly not
We formulate this argument in terms of evolutionary game theory and prove, under generic assumptions, that the probability that fitness payoff functions are homomorphisms of certain structures in the world approaches zero as the number of possible world states and potential payoff values become large
The four theorems that we prove concern the information about these structures made available to perceivers by fitness payoff functions
Summary
If the experienced world of a neonate is unstructured, a “great blooming, buzzing confusion”, that of the adult is assuredly not. Psychophysics assumes that “physical variables,” including light intensity, acoustic amplitude, etc., are objective components of the OIW, and that descriptions of the OIW that are based on direct measurements of such physical variables provide a “ground truth” against which less-direct measurements can be validated In this case, empirical evidence for psychophysical mappings (such as Stevens’ power law) from physical variables to experienced magnitudes or other outcomes is evidence that such experiences are homomorphic to structurers within the OIW, and are veridical. We consider by far the most common argument for veridicality: that natural selection over evolutionary time will drive the perceptual systems of organisms to at least an approximation of veridicality We formulate this argument in terms of evolutionary game theory and prove, under generic assumptions, that the probability that fitness payoff functions are homomorphisms of certain structures in the world approaches zero as the number of possible world states and potential payoff values become large. The results present a constraint for any theory of consciousness which assumes that structure in perceptual experience is shaped by natural selection
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