Fact, Belief, and the Attribution of Prejudice

Abstract

People respond differently to individuals they label as prejudiced. It is not clear whether prejudice is attributed to individuals who believe that two groups are unequal, or only to those whose belief in inequality is factually unjustified. The present studies disentangle the effect of these two aspects of belief. In the first experiment, from information on both an individual's belief (a particular hypothetical group is better, same, or worse) and objective reality (the group is in fact better or worse), 180 subjects rated the belief on a 7-point scale ranging from ”strongly prejudiced in favor of ”to” strongly prejudiced against.” Group consensus on the individual's belief was included as a control variable. In two subsequent experiments, the beliefs concerned real-world rather than hypothetical groups. The three experiments produced virtually identical results. Greatest prejudice was attributed to an individual's belief that groups differed, even when that belief was supported by the facts; least prejudice was attributed to a belief in no difference between the groups, even when that belief was contradicted by the facts.