Facing the challenge of migratory vulnerability in the European Court of Human Rights

Abstract

The European Court of Human Rights has struggled to integrate the lived experience of migrants into the legal reasoning that underlies a determination of human rights violations. This article introduces the concept of migratory vulnerability in an effort to remedy that shortcoming by making an already existing legal principle fit for the daunting task posed by migration cases. The objective is to preserve (and potentially expand) the legal effects of the principle of vulnerability whilst approximating it to the more consistent conception of vulnerability theorists, which would remove some of its ambiguities and negative side effects. Migratory vulnerability describes a cluster of objective, socially induced, and temporary characteristics that affect persons to varying extents and in different forms. It therefore should be conceptualized neither as group membership nor as a purely individual characteristic, but rather determined on a case-by-case basis and in reference to identifiable social processes. Depending on its specific expression, migratory vulnerability may give rise to distinct legal effects such as enlarged scopes of protection, shifts in the burden of proof, procedural and positive obligations, a narrower margin of appreciation, and possibly even the ‘triggering’ of proceedings under Article 14 ECHR.