Facility-Associated Release of Polioviruses into Communities-Risks for the Posteradication Era.

Ananda S Bandyopadhyay,Jeffrey Partridge,Jay Wenger,John F Modlin,Jacqueline Fournier-Caruana,Harpal Singh,Roland W Sutter,Michel J Zaffran

doi:10.3201/eid2507.181703

Abstract

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative continues to make progress toward the eradication target. Indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) type 2 was last detected in 1999, WPV type 3 was last detected in 2012, and over the past 2 years WPV type 1 has been detected only in parts of 2 countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan). Once the eradication of poliomyelitis is achieved, infectious and potentially infectious poliovirus materials retained in laboratories, vaccine production sites, and other storage facilities will continue to pose a risk for poliovirus reintroduction into communities. The recent breach in containment of WPV type 2 in an inactivated poliovirus vaccine manufacturing site in the Netherlands prompted this review, which summarizes information on facility-associated release of polioviruses into communities reported over >8 decades. Successful polio eradication requires the management of poliovirus containment posteradication to prevent the consequences of the reestablishment of poliovirus transmission.

Highlights

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative continues to make progress toward the eradication target
A laboratory accident involving the release of WPV2 from an inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) manufacturing site in the Netherlands in April 2017 [10,11,12] motivated this historical review to describe the frequency and consequences of similar breaches
In 1955, distribution of 120,000 doses of IPV that had been inadequately inactivated during the production step resulted in the paralysis of 51 children, 5 of whom died; secondary transmission was reported among 113 contacts who experienced

Summary

Introduction

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative continues to make progress toward the eradication target. Once the eradication of poliomyelitis is achieved, infectious and potentially infectious poliovirus materials retained in laboratories, vaccine production sites, and other storage facilities will continue to pose a risk for poliovirus reintroduction into communities. The recent breach in containment of WPV type 2 in an inactivated poliovirus vaccine manufacturing site in the Netherlands prompted this review, which summarizes information on facility-associated release of polioviruses into communities reported over >8 decades. A laboratory accident involving the release of WPV2 from an inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) manufacturing site in the Netherlands in April 2017 [10,11,12] motivated this historical review to describe the frequency and consequences of similar breaches. Our objective is to remind management and workers at all laboratory and manufacturing facilities of their responsibility to assess the risks of stored materials [13]

Objectives

Methods

Results

Conclusion