Abstract
In normal form games, we model the largely observed psychological phenomenon of systematic and extreme punishment after a deviation, regardless of the cost. After establishing basic properties, we show that this notion characterizes a weak form of Pareto optimality. Every Pareto optimal outcome can also be sustained by the threat of extreme punishment, which cannot be achieved in general through Nash equilibria strategies, nor with tit-for-tat strategies.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
