Abstract
This paper investigates IPO performance in the wealthy economies of the Gulf countries using restricted access data from regularity bodies. Contrary to asymmetric information theories, we find that IPO performance relies crucially on the unique institutional framework adopted by regulators. We also find that governance regulation in economies with weak regulation tends to provide better protection for investors in IPO markets. Finally, we find that underpricing is more severe when foreign investors are banned from sharing IPOs.
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