Abstract

ABSTRACTThe transfer of oil and mining revenues to the subnational governments of resource-rich jurisdictions is a common policy aimed at promoting development and reducing local opposition to extraction. In the early 2000s, Peru implemented a radical version of that policy. Peruvian mining regions received fiscal transfers many times greater than the national average during the last commodity boom. The strategy had mixed effects on well-being indicators. These transfers had statistically significant positive effects on economic growth and the rate of school attendance at different ages. In contrast, they did not have a significant impact on poverty reduction or the coverage of other basic services, while being positively correlated with an increase in the income gap between women and men. Overall, the results are not as positive as the promoters had expected. The transfers generated political incentives for local authorities to pursue short-term, clientelistic spending that has reduced their potential benefits.

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