Externalities, Welfare, and the Feasibility of Corrective Taxes

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Previous articleNext article No AccessCommunicationsExternalities, Welfare, and the Feasibility of Corrective TaxesR. Dusansky, and P. J. KalmanR. Dusansky Search for more articles by this author , and P. J. Kalman Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 80, Number 5Sep. - Oct., 1972 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/259951 Views: 4Total views on this site Citations: 5Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1972 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Richard Dusansky, Peter J. Kalman Optimal Housing Supply Over Time Under Uncertainty, (Jan 1978): 151–167.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95331-6_8 William J. Baumol It Takes Two to Tango, or Sind ``Separable Externalities'' Überhaupt Möglich?, Journal of Political Economy 84, no.22 (Oct 2015): 381–387.https://doi.org/10.1086/260441Rupert Windisch Coase-Paradigma versus Pigou-Paradigma: Über Information und Motivation als Grundfragen dezentralisierter Umweltkontrolle, Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 35, no.3-43-4 (Sep 1975): 345–390.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01284621Estelle James Optimal pollution control and trade in collective goods, Journal of Public Economics 3, no.33 (Aug 1974): 203–216.https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(74)90011-5Marshall Rose Market problems in the distribution of emission rights, Water Resources Research 9, no.55 (Jul 2010): 1132–1144.https://doi.org/10.1029/WR009i005p01132