Abstract
John Henry Newman's distinction between uncultivated (unreflective) and cultivated (reflective) dimensions of the illative sense in the Grammar of Assent resembles, to some extent, the current epistemological discussion about internalism and externalism. 1 The illative sense is principally a natural faculty of judgment, and it has both unreflective and reflective levels. The former kind of cognitive activity combines various phenomena without awareness of how things obtain, while the latter, as a result of appropriate training and the cultivation of complex assent (or a philosophical habit of mind), deciphers how various pieces of data hang together in light of one another. As I intend to show, working through this distinction has significant implications for the constructive task of developing a robust epistemology of cultivated judgment.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
