External referents and past outcomes as determinants of social discontent

Abstract

Two experiments were conducted comparing the effectiveness of various patterns of outcomes in producing dissatisfaction, anger, and aggression. In Expt I, subjects, assigned the role of workers in a factory game, received either a uniformly high, a uniformly low, or a decremental pattern of outcomes from a hypothetical managerial elite. Half the subjects in each outcome condition were provided with external referents indicating the relative value of their outcomes. As hypothesized, when external referents were present, the low outcome schedule produced the most dissatisfaction, the high schedule the least, and the decremental schedule an intermediate amount. In the absence of external referents, the decremental schedule produced the most dissatisfaction. Similarly, when external referents were present, subjects receiving low outcomes awarded their managers the least valuable prizes; when external referents were absent, subjects receiving the decremental schedule awarded the least valuable prizes. The aggression measure was relatively insensitive to the independent manipulations. In Expt II, a modified aggression measure indicated that the decremental curve produced more aggression when external referents were absent than when they were present.