Abstract

The thesis of the extended mind (ExM) holds that the material underpinnings of an individual’s mental states and processes need not be restricted to those contained within biological boundaries: when conditions are right, material artefacts can be incorporated by the thinking subject in such a way as to become a component of her extended mind. Up to this point, the focus of this approach has been on phenomena of a distinctively cognitive nature, such as states of dispositional belief, and processes of planning and calculation. In this paper, we aim to expand the scope of ExM by considering the case for extended affectivity. We begin by clarifying the central commitments of ExM, before investigating its applicability to a range of affective phenomena, both dispositional and occurrent. We argue that proponents of ExM should also accept that the vehicles of emotions, moods, sentiments, temperaments, and character traits can extend beyond skull and skin.

Highlights

  • According to the thesis of the extended mind (ExM ), under certain circumstances we should see the material vehicles that realize the mind as encompassing not just brain activity, and that of the body and the material environment

  • The thesis of the extended mind (ExM) holds that the material underpinnings of an individual’s mental states and processes need not be restricted to those contained within biological boundaries: when conditions are right, material artefacts can be incorporated by the thinking subject in such a way as to become a component of her extended mind

  • We argue that proponents of ExM should accept that the vehicles of emotions, moods, sentiments, temperaments, and character traits can extend beyond skull and skin

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Summary

Introduction

According to the thesis of the extended mind (ExM ), under certain circumstances we should see the material vehicles that realize the mind as encompassing not just brain activity, and that of the body and the material environment This ‘‘vehicle externalist’’ thesis was formulated by Clark and Chalmers (1998) and has been further elaborated by Andy Clark in subsequent works (e.g., Clark 2003, 2008, 2010a, b), partly in response to critical engagement by those sympathetic to internalism (for example by Adams and Aizawa 2001, 2010a, b; Rupert 2004; Weiskopf 2008). Our most general aim in this paper, is to enrich the debate over ExM further, partly by clarifying its central commitments and implications, and partly (and more interestingly) by developing it in a novel context To this purpose, we begin with an overview of ExM, distinguishing in particular two of its targets: standing dispositional mental states, and temporary, occurrent cognitive processes.

The extended mind thesis
The realm of the affective
Extending affective dispositions
The case of occurrent affective states
Conclusion
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