Abstract

What does it take to convert the deliverances of an extended cognitive process into knowledge (i.e. extended knowledge)? It is argued that virtue epistemology, at least of an epistemic externalist kind (virtue reliabilism, as it is known), offers the resources to satisfactorily answer this question, provided that one rids the view of its implicit (and sometimes explicit) commitment to epistemic individualism. Nonetheless, it is also claimed that while virtue reliabilism can accommodate extended cognition, there are limits to the extent to which virtuous epistemic standings can be extended. In particular, it is argued that it is in the nature of intellectual virtue to be directed at non-extended epistemic standings. This point has important implications for an extended virtue epistemology, as is illustrated by considering how this point plays out in the context of the contemporary debate regarding the epistemology of education.

Highlights

  • One of the most influential movements in contemporary cognitive science of recent years is the extended cognition research programme

  • One question we might naturally raise in this regard is what, if anything, it takes to convert a cognitive success that is acquired via an extended cognitive process into knowledge

  • This reflects the fact that mainstream epistemology has tended to be uncritically wedded⎯often implicitly, but sometimes explicitly⎯to epistemological individualism, whereby epistemic standings such as knowledge are always the result of cognitive processes that are internal to the biological subject

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Summary

Introduction

One of the most influential movements in contemporary cognitive science of recent years is the extended cognition research programme. It seems that the cognitive process is extended, what is supporting the knowledge in this case is something purely internal to the subject and which is not dependent upon the external device⎯i.e., the rational endorsement of the information displayed by the iPhone.

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