Abstract
Many U.S. allies are increasingly dependent on space-based platforms for their military and economic activities. At the same time, the counterspace threats from U.S. adversaries such as China and Russia are rapidly intensifying. The United States has provided extended deterrence to its allies through its overwhelming nuclear and conventional capabilities for decades. The question arises as to whether the time-tested logic of extended deterrence is applicable in the space domain. This research argues that U.S. extended deterrence in space—relying on the traditional mechanism of deterrence-by-punishment—is ineffective due to the unique nature of outer space.
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