Abstract
Vehicle externalism maintains that the vehicles of our mental representations can be located outside of the head, that is, they need not be instantiated by neurons located inside the brain of the cogniser. But some disagree, insisting that ‘non-derived’, or ‘original’, content is the mark of the cognitive and that only biologically instantiated representational vehicles can have non-derived content, while the contents of all extra-neural representational vehicles are derived and thus lie outside the scope of the cognitive. In this paper we develop one aspect of Menary’s vehicle externalist theory of cognitive integration—the process of enculturation—to respond to this longstanding objection. We offer examples of how expert mathematicians introduce new symbols to represent new mathematical possibilities that are not yet understood, and we argue that these new symbols have genuine non-derived content, that is, content that is not dependent on an act of interpretation by a cognitive agent and that does not derive from conventional associations, as many linguistic representations do.
Highlights
Philosophers of mind have traditionally believed that our representations are instantiated by states of the brain and, located ‘internally’, or entirely in one’s head
Menary’s theory of cognitive integration is a version of vehicle externalism and, as such, it faces a longstanding objection to vehicle externalism as raised by Adams and Aizawa
We have argued against the second claim, demonstrating instead that there are cases in mathematics where external symbols have content that is not derived either from conventional associations or from the representational states of a cognitive agent
Summary
Philosophers of mind have traditionally believed that our representations are instantiated by states of the brain and, located ‘internally’, or entirely in one’s head. Synthese (2020) 197:3757–3777 and Chalmers 1998), most argue that environmental states and processes can be seamlessly integrated with the functions of our neural states and processes, making the two—external and internal states and processes— essential for some aspects our cognitive life On this view, cognitive processes are not merely ‘scaffolded’ by tools and structures in the environment (Vygotsky 1930)—they are partially constituted by, rather than merely causally dependent on, external structures. We argue that the contents of these symbols are not derived from any other representational state, nor are they derived from purely conventional associations. Rather, they stand as an example of external, non-biologically instantiated representations with non-derived content
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