Abstract
Abstract The pervasiveness of law enforcement schemes that prescribe harsher penalties for repeat offenders continues to challenge scholars who seek an economic explanation for criminal justice policies. The current paper formalizes an explanation suggested by Dana, D. (2001. Rethinking the puzzle of escalating penalties for repeat offenders. Yale Law J. 110: 733–783), which is based on the role of the law in educating people about wrongful behavior—the so-called “expressive function” of law. The analysis shows that an escalating structure that imposes a lenient sanction on all first-timers and a harsh sanction on repeaters represents a compromise solution that is (second best) optimal if the fraction of unknowing offenders in the population of potential offenders (as opposed to rational calculators) is sufficiently large.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
